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Abstract:  This paper theoretically considers the optimal balance between the merchant 
fee and the cardholder fee (rewards) from both efficiency and equity perspectives.  First, 
the paper constructs the models that can be used by the U.S. policymakers. Because 
theoretical results are very sensitive to the assumptions of the models, it is important to 
construct models that reflect the reality of the market. Second, the most efficient fee 
structure and product price are considered under the various combinations of the 
assumptions. And finally, the paper considers welfare consequences of the most efficient 
fee structure.   
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1 Payments System Research Function, Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas 
City. E-mail: fumiko.hayashi@kc.frb.org.  The views expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System. 1.  Introduction 
As card payments have become more prevalent, the fee structures of payment cards have 
been attracting more policy debates and public policy interventions. In many countries, public 
policy interventions have reduced the level of fees paid by merchants and as a result either 
payment card rewards received by card users have been reduced or fees paid by card users have 
been raised. In contrast to the trend in many other countries, the U.S. public authorities and 
legislature have not taken actions until very recently and both the merchant fees and payment 
card rewards have continued to increase. In 2008, the U.S. legislature has introduced two bills in 
Congress, which are aiming to change the balance between the merchant fee and the cardholder 
fee (or rewards). 
Although policymakers may be urged to take actions to resolve the heating policy debates 
between the merchants and the card networks, before taking actions they should consider three 
key questions, regarding payment card fee structures.  First, what is the optimal balance between 
the merchant fee and cardholder fee (or payment card rewards)? Second, if the market cannot 
reach the optimal balance, what market forces cause the equilibrium fee structure to deviate from 
the optimal fee structure? And third, what are policy options?  This paper is the first of a series of 
three papers, each of which addresses each of the three questions above.   
Knowing the optimal balance between the merchant fee and cardholder fee is important 
for policymakers.  Policymakers cannot evaluate the current fee structure determined at the 
market place—whether the current fee structure is close enough to the optimal fee structure—
without knowing the optimal fee structure. The optimal fee structure can also be the target of 
policies that policymakers would potentially implement. 
  2There are two commonly used criteria to consider the “optimal” fee structures or price 
levels. One is efficiency and the other is equity.  Efficiency is often measured by social welfare, 
which aggregates welfares of all parties involved in the market.  The most efficient card fee 
structure, therefore, can be defined as the fee structure that maximizes social welfare of all 
parties involved in the payment card market. Equity considers the distribution of social welfare 
among different parties. In contrast to efficiency, there is no clear way to measure equity.  
Furthermore, sometimes equity and efficiency contradict: It is possible that the most efficient 
card fee structure results in a much skewed welfare distribution. With a given card fee structure, 
if only one entity or party absorbs all welfare gains and the rest incur welfare losses, then the fee 
structure has a problem from the equity point of view, even if the fee structure maximizes social 
welfare. Thus, political decision is required to define the “optimal” fee structure.  This paper 
does not define the “optimal” fee structure; rather, the paper examines how the most efficient 
card fee structure affects welfare distribution among different parties.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 constructs theoretical models, 
taking into account institutional features of the U.S. payment card market.  Section 3 examines 
the most efficient fee structures. Section 4 examines the welfare distribution under the most 
efficient fee structure. Section 5 concludes.  
2.  Models 
This section constructs theoretical models that can be used by the U.S. policymakers 
when considering potential public policies. There is a large body of theoretical literature on 
payment card fee structure.
2 We have learned that the theoretical results are very sensitive to the 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Chakravorti (2003). 
  3assumptions of the models.
3 Therefore, constructing models that reflect the reality of the market 
is especially important for policymakers who implement actual policies.  
There are several models that are used to analyze the most efficient fee structure. Among 
them, we use the model constructed by Rochet and Tirole (2002) (hereafter RT) as our base 
model, because the model reflects some of the institutional features in the U.S. market.
4 We 
extend their model, allowing some of the assumptions to vary. In the first half of this section, we 
consider key assumptions that reflect the U.S. payment card market. Then, in the second half, we 
construct our models.  
2.1 Assumptions 
RT model 
The RT model assumes that the fee structure does not affect the number of merchants 
who accept the cards.  In the model, the consumer’s cardholding behavior and card usage 
behavior are not separated; however, one can interpret the model that all consumers hold a card 
and their usage decision is affected by the cardholder fee. Consumers ultimately determine which 
payment method to use: consumers use cards when their transactional benefit exceeds the 
cardholder fee. Transactional benefit of a card transaction is defined as the saving of opportunity 
cost of using the alternative payment method, such as cash. Consumers are assumed to be 
heterogeneous in terms of their transactional benefit from a card transaction, while merchants are 
assumed to be homogeneous. Merchants are required not to set different prices according to the 
payment methods their customers choose. In addition, their model (implicitly) assumes that i) 
                                                 
3 Hayashi and Weiner (2006). 
4 RT model focuses on payment methods’ payment function, and thus it does not consider the benefits/costs of credit 
card’s credit function.  This paper also focuses on credit card’s payment function, rather than its credit function. In 
this sense, the model considers credit cards as “charge” cards.  
  4consumers make a fixed number of transactions (i.e., they purchase a fixed number of goods 
regardless of the price) and ii) per transaction costs and fees for the payment methods are fixed 
regardless of the transaction value. 
The U.S. payment card markets are matured  
In the RT model, the number of merchants who accept the cards is fixed regardless of the 
merchant fee level.  As mentioned, their model can be interpreted as if all consumers hold a card 
and their usage is affected by the cardholder fee. In this sense, the model assumes there is usage 
externality but no membership externality in the market. 
Payment card markets potentially have two-types of externalities—membership externality 
and usage externality. Membership externality (or positive feedback) arises from membership 
decisions: A consumer’s cardholding of a particular network’s card depends on how many 
merchants accept that network’s cards.  Similarly, a merchant’s card acceptance of a particular 
network’s cards depends on how many current and potential customers use that network’s cards.  
Usage externality arises from usage decision. In a payment market, consumers choose a payment 
method from a set of payment methods the merchant accepts.  The consumer’s choice of 
payment methods affects the merchant benefits/costs. However, the consumer’s private incentive 
typically does not reflect the merchant benefits/costs.    
Once the market matured, the positive feedback becomes almost negligible. That means, 
additional cardholders do not influence merchant card acceptance and additional merchants do 
not influence consumer cardholding. In contrast, usage externality exists, even after the market 
matured. Because the U.S. payment card markets can be considered to be matured, it may be 
appropriate to assume usage externality only. 
  5Consumers 
The RT model assumes that consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the transactional 
benefit from the card and use the card when their transactional benefit from the card exceeds the 
cardholder fee. A consumer’s transactional benefit from cards may consist of three parts. One is 
resource cost saving by using a card as opposed to using an alternative payment method, such as 
cash or checks. For example, time spent at the casher may be much shorter if consumers use a 
card rather than checks. The second part is differences in benefits. Consumers may receive more 
benefits by using a card, such as record keeping, security, etc., but consumers may lose some 
benefits, such as anonymity or privacy. The last part is a saving from not paying fees to the 
banks or payment service providers for the alternative payment methods. How to value resource 
cost saving or difference in benefits may vary by individual consumers significantly. How the 
fees paid by consumers affect the consumers’ choice of payment methods has not been fully 
uncovered.  However, assuming the cardholder fee affects the consumer’s card usage is more 
flexible than the other way. The model can treat it as a special case if the cardholder fee does not 
affect the consumer’s payment choice.  
In the RT model, consumers are assumed to make a fixed number of transactions. This 
assumption is likely to be true for some products and services but consumer demand for other 
products may increase as the product prices decrease or the rewards received by card users 
increase. The rewards received by card users affect the card users’ effective price of product.  A 
card-using consumer’s effective price is the product price plus the cardholder fee (or minus 
rewards) minus the transactional benefit from cards, while a non-card-using consumer’s effective 
price is the product price itself. Because there is little empirical evidence about which 
assumptions are more realistic, this paper considers both cases. 
  6Merchants   
Although some merchants are possibly monopolistic, many U.S. merchants are 
considered to be quite competitive. While monopolistic merchants are likely very sensitive to the 
merchant fee, competitive or oligopolistic merchants are less sensitive to the merchant fee, 
because of the strategic motives.  Even when the merchant fees are quite high compared with the 
merchant transactional benefit from cards, competition among merchants may keep the 
merchants from rejecting the cards, given their rival merchants are accepting the cards.
5 
Therefore, the assumption that merchants are less sensitive to the merchant fee may reflect the 
U.S. merchant behavior well.   
A merchant’s transactional benefit from cards is assumed to consist of two parts.
6 One is 
the resource cost saving by a card transaction as opposed to an alternative payment method 
transaction. The other part is saving from not paying fees to the banks or payment service 
providers for the alternative payment methods. 
As the RT model assumes, this paper also assumes merchants are homogeneous in terms 
of the transactional benefit from cards and the cost of selling a unit of goods. Although 
merchants are quite different across industries, they are more homogeneous within an industry, 
in terms of transactional benefit, costs of selling and markup per unit of goods.  Because in the 
United States, interchange fees (and thus merchant fees) are typically industry specific, this 
assumption can be justifiable within an industry.  
Card networks    
Payment card schemes take one of two principal organizational forms.  One is four-party 
schemes: Four-parties are cardholders, merchants, card issuers, and merchant acquirers. Both 
                                                 
5 Hayashi (2006). 
6 A merchant transactional benefit from a card may include another part. According to a report by Government 
Accountability Office (2008), accepting cards improves internal operations at merchants. 
  7card issuers and merchant acquirers should be members of a payment card network. In a four-
party scheme network, an interchange fee is set by the card network and paid by the merchant 
acquirer to the card issuer.
7  The merchant pays a merchant (discount) fee to the merchant 
acquirer.  The merchant fee is set by each merchant acquirer, and a typical merchant acquirer 
entirely passes through the interchange fee to its merchants and charges other fees, such as an 
acquirer processing fee, association dues, and a switch fee. The cardholder either receives 
rewards or pays a cardholder fee to its card issuer. Each card issuer sets its own rewards or 
cardholder fees, and typically rewards are mostly financed by the issuer’s interchange fee 
revenue.
8 The other organizational form is three-party schemes: Three parties are cardholders, 
merchants and a card network, such as American Express and Discover. In contrast to the four-
party schemes, there is no interchange fee, because the card network acts as card issuer and 
merchant acquirer.  The merchant pays a merchant fee to the card network and the cardholder 
either receives rewards or pays a cardholder fee to the network.  The network sets both merchant 
fees and cardholder fees. 
If transferring funds between the acquirer and the issuer (i.e., interchange fee) is allowed in 
a four-party scheme network, a three-party scheme network and a four-party scheme network are 
almost equivalent when social welfare is considered.  In a social welfare function, a card 
network’s profit is considered to be the joint profits of the card network and its member acquirers 
and issuers, in the case of four-party scheme network.   
                                                 
7 In some networks, the interchange fee flows from the card issuer to the merchant acquirers.  However, in the 
United States, the interchange fee flows from the merchant acquirer to the card issuer.  
8 The author obtained this information from industry experts at the “Consumer Behavior and Payment Choice 
Conference” held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in July, 2006. 
  8Nature of per transaction costs and fees 
As the majority of models assume, the RT model assumes that per transaction costs, fees, 
and benefits for payment methods are fixed regardless of the transaction value (flat per 
transaction costs, fees, and benefits).  Only a few models assume per transaction costs, fees, and 
benefits are proportional to the transaction value.
9  According to cost studies in the United 
States, some of the costs and fees are fixed and some are proportional to the transaction value. 
Typically, interchange fee structure (thus merchant fee structure) consists of a fixed portion and 
a proportional portion. For credit cards, a fixed portion is relatively small, while for debit cards, 
especially for PIN debit cards, the interchange fee is more or less a flat fee—the fee reaches its 
cap at the average transaction value. A bank’s costs of processing a cash or a credit card 
transaction seem to be proportional to the transaction value, while their costs of processing a 
debit card or a check transaction seems not to be influenced by the transaction value. A 
merchant’s resource costs seem to be proportional for credit cards and cash and to be flat for 
debit cards and checks. Some of the consumer’s transactional benefits from payment methods, 
such as book keeping and anonymity might not be influenced by the transaction value, but other 
benefits might be proportional to transaction value. Thus, two extreme cases can be considered. 
In one case, all costs and fees (and benefits) per transaction are fixed, and in the other case, all of 
them are proportional to the transaction value. This paper considers both cases.  
Merchant ability to set different prices according to the payment methods 
Currently, many card networks have a rule that restricts merchants setting different prices 
for their customers according to the payment method they use. Although merchants are allowed 
to offer a cash discount for their customers, many of them do not do so. Therefore, the models 
assuming that merchants set the same price for both card-using and non-card-using consumers 
                                                 
9 For example, McAndrews and Wang (2006).  
  9are well aligned with the practice. However, abolishing this rule is often considered to be a 
viable public policy option. Therefore, this paper considers both cases. 
2.2 Models 
Base model 
The base model is the following. The payment card markets are considered to be 
matured. All consumers hold at least one card and merchants accept cards as long as the 
merchant fees are lower than a certain threshold level, which is endogenously determined.   
Consumers are heterogeneous in their transactional benefit from cards as opposed to the 
alternative payments. A consumer’s transactional benefit from a card,  B b , consists of three parts. 
One is a gross benefit minus gross cost from using a card,  ;
C
B B
10 one is a gross benefit minus 
gross cost from using the alternative payment method,  ; and one is the consumer fee paid for 
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function of  , and a cumulative distribution function of  . Consumers pay the 
cardholder fee of   when they use a card.      
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Merchants are homogeneous (at least ex-ante) and their transactional benefit from cards, 
, is defined as the merchant cost for the alternative payment method,  , plus the merchant 
fee paid for the alternative payment method,   , minus the merchant cost for a card transaction, 
 (i.e.,  ). Merchants pay the merchant fee of  when their customers use a 
card.  Merchants also incur a cost of selling one unit of goods,  .  
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10 Note that the fees for a card transaction are not included in the cost.  
  10Assumptions that can be varied 
The assumptions in the final models vary in terms of three categories: (i) Per transaction 
costs and fees; (ii) Consumer demand for goods; and (iii) Merchant ability to set different prices 
according to the payment method. There are two variations in each category. Per transaction 
costs and fees are either flat or proportional to the transaction value. Consumer demand for 
goods is either elastic (i.e., a consumer makes a fixed number of transactions) or downward-
sloping (i.e., the number of transactions increases as the effective price of goods decreases).    
And finally, a merchant either sets the same price for all of its customers regardless of the 
payment method or sets the different prices according to the payment method its customers use.      
3.  The Most Efficient Fee Structure 
The most efficient fee structure is defined as the fee structure that maximizes social 
welfare.  Social welfare is defined as the aggregate surpluses of all parties involved in the 
payment card markets. Parties involved in the payment card markets are card-using consumers, 
non-card-using consumers, merchants, card networks, and payment service providers that 
provide the alternative payment method. Since payment cards are considered to be a substitute 
for the alternative payment methods, such as cash and checks, the surplus of a consumer who 
uses an alternative payment method and the surplus of alternative payment method service 
providers are also counted in social welfare.  Payment cards can be provided by four-party 
scheme networks. Therefore, a card network’s surplus can be interpreted as the joint surpluses of 
the card network and its member acquirers and issuers.      
Policymakers should be interested in the most efficient fee structures for two reasons. First, 
the most efficient fee structure can be used to examine whether the current fee structure is 
  11efficient or not. Second, the most efficient fee structure can be the target of policies that 
policymakers would potentially implement.   
Existing theoretical models consider the most efficient fee structures in rather limited 
circumstances. Most models assume 1) consumers make a fixed number of transactions; 2) costs 
and fees per transaction do not vary by the transaction value (flat per transaction costs and fees); 
and 3) merchants are not allowed to set different product prices according to the payment 
methods. However, as discussed in the previous section, it is possible that a consumer’s quantity 
demanded for goods depends on the effective price the consumer faces and that costs and fees 
per transaction are proportional to the transaction value. Potential policies may allow merchants 
to set discriminatory pricing.  Thus, it is important to examine how the differences in these 
assumptions affect the most efficient fee structures. 
In the first four subsections, we examine how consumer demand for goods and per 
transaction costs and fees affect the most efficient payment card fee structures by assuming 
merchants set the same price for both card-using and non-card-using consumers. In the last 
subsection, we relax this assumption and examine how merchant’s ability to set different prices 
across payment methods affects the most efficient fee structure.     
3.1 Scenario I: Fixed Number of Transactions and Flat Per-Transaction Costs and Fees  
Assume that each consumer receives gross benefit, υ  , by purchasing one unit of product. 
Since merchants set the same price for card-using consumers and non-card-using consumers, 
consumers whose transactional benefit exceeds the cardholder fee (i.e.,  ) 
use a card and consumers whose transactional benefit is below the cardholder fee use an 
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The first two terms of equation 1 are the surpluses of card-using consumers and non-card-using 
consumers, respectively, and the third and fourth terms are the merchants’ profits from card-
using consumers and from non-card-using consumers, respectively, and the last two terms are the 
card networks’ profits and the (joint) profits of alternative payment method service providers.  
This social welfare function is essentially the same as the social welfare function defined 
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and the first term is fixed regardless of the payment card fee structure. The most efficient 
cardholder fee,  , satisfies the first-order condition: 
* f
S
A A A b c m f c f ˆ )} ( {
* − − + + = . (2) 
This condition implies that the most efficient cardholder fee is the difference between the 
payment service providers’ (card networks and alternative payment service providers) net costs 
of processing a card transaction and the merchant transactional benefit from a card. To the extent 
that allowing the alternative payment method generates profits or losses (i.e.,   
or ) to maximize social welfare depends on the policymakers’ objectives. To 
simplify the model, we assume that the alternative payment method generates zero profit 
hereafter. Note that if payment service providers of the alternative payment method jointly earn 
zero profit from the alternative payment method, then the most efficient cardholder fee is the 
0 > − +
A A A c m f
0 < − +
A A A c m f
  13difference between the card networks’ costs of processing a card transaction and the merchant 
transactional benefit from a card.   
S b c f ˆ * − = . (2’) 
We should note that neither the product price nor merchant fee affects social welfare 
although they are likely to affect the welfare distribution among different parties.    
3.2 Scenario II: Fixed Number of Transactions and Proportional Per-Transaction Costs 
and Fees 
The social welfare function is the same as equation 1 except for the costs, fees, and 
benefits for payment methods are proportional to the price of the goods.
11  
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The first-order condition with respect to the cardholder fee gives the same condition as equation 
2’.  Thus, the most efficient cardholder fee is the same regardless of whether per transaction 
costs and fees are flat or proportional to the transaction value when consumers make a fixed 
number of purchases and transactions.  
However, the product price affects the social welfare when costs and fees per transaction 
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11 Note that we assume that payment service providers of the alternative payment method jointly earn zero profit 
from the alternative payment method.  
  14This condition implies that if aggregate surpluses from using a card (the first term) exceed 
aggregate surpluses from using the alternative payment method (the second term), then the social 
welfare increases as the product price increases. The highest product price that satisfies all 
parties’ incentive compatibility constraints is the one that makes the marginal card user’s surplus 
from using a card zero.
12 That is  , where  is the marginal card 
user i ’s gross benefit minus gross cost of using a card. If equation 4 is negative, the social 
welfare increases as the product price decreases. The lowest price can be achieved when 
merchants set the product price at the marginal cost and card networks set the merchant fee so 
that they earn zero profit from cards.  The lowest price 
)) ( 1 /( M B i B f p − + =υ
C C ) ( M B i B
M
C







 can be achieved when 
the card networks set the merchant fee at  .   S b m =
The summary of the most efficient fee structure and product price is the following: 
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S b c f ˆ * − = , and the merchant fee and product price do not affect social welfare.    
                                                 
12 Marginal card user is defined as the consumer who is indifferent between using a card and the alternative payment 
method.  
  153.3 Scenario III: Downward-sloping Consumer Demands and Flat Per-Transaction Costs 
and Fees 
There are several variations when the market demand curve is downward sloping. Even 
though each consumer purchases a fixed number of products, if each consumer i has a different 
reservation utility, i υ , then the number of consumers who purchase the product increases as the 
price of the goods decreases.
13 This section, however, assumes that each consumer has a 
downward-sloping demand curve for goods.  
Assume that the alternative payment method (such as cash) is a “base” payment method 
for all consumers. That is, when product price is  p , the quantity demanded by a consumer who 
uses the alternative payment method is  bp a p D − = ) ( . The quantity demanded by a card user 
depends not only on the product price but also on the cardholder fee and the transactional benefit 
from cards. Two extreme cases can be considered. One case is where a consumer purchases 
goods on one transaction. The other case is where a consumer purchases one unit of goods per 
transaction.
14 In the former case, the effective price of a card-using consumer with transactional 
benefit of   is likely the same as that of a consumer who uses an alternative payment method; 
however, using a card effectively increases his income by 
B b
f bB − . In the latter case, the effective 
price of a card-using consumer with transactional benefit of   is  B b B b f p − + . Thus, his quantity 
demanded becomes ) ( ) ( B b f p b a p D − + − =  when he uses a card. This paper focuses on the 
latter case: because in the former case, the (per transaction) fee structure of payment card and 
product price alone cannot maximize social welfare without violating some parties’ incentive 
compatibility constraints.  
                                                 
13 Schuh, Shy, and Stavins (2008).   
14 Schwartz and Vincent (2006). 
  16The social welfare function is defined as:
 15
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The first-order conditions with respect to the cardholder fee and with respect to the product price 
are, respectively: 
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Equation 7 implies that the product price that maximizes social welfare is:  
)) ( 1 )( ˆ ( ˆ * f H f b c c b d p S
C
S S − − − + − + =  (7’) 
We obtain two ’s from equations 6 and 7’, but the second-order condition is satisfied only in 
one of the two, which is:   .   
f
S b c f ˆ * − =
Thus, the most efficient fee structure and product price are:   and 
. To achieve the most efficient product price without violating any parties’ 
incentive compatibility constraints, the merchant fee needs to be set at  . The most 
efficient cardholder fee is the same as the previous two scenarios and the most efficient product 
price can be achieved when merchants practice marginal cost pricing and card networks earn 
zero profit from the cards.    
S b c f ˆ * − =
C
S S c b d p − + = ˆ *
S b m ˆ * =
                                                 
15 Again, we assume that payment service providers of the alternative payment method jointly earn zero profit from 
the alternative payment method. 
  173.4 Scenario IV: Downward-sloping Consumer Demands and Proportional Per-
Transaction Costs and Fees 
Assume that each consumer has a downward-sloping demand curve. When per 
transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, whether the consumer 
purchases goods on one transaction or the consumer purchases one unit of goods per transaction 
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The first best solution violates merchant and/or card network’s incentive compatibility 
constraints: That means either merchants or card networks or both make losses at the first best 
solution.  The second best solution is, therefore, to maximize consumer surplus subject to the 






B b d b h
b
bp a
b d b h
b


















, 0 ) ( ) }( ) 1 ( {
) ( )} 1 ( }{ ) 1 ( {    s.t.
= − +
= − − − − +




b d b h bp a d c m p















                                                 
16 We assume that payment service providers of the alternative payment method jointly earn zero profit from the 
alternative payment method. 
  18The incentive compatibility constraints imply that when  ,  S b c f ˆ − =
C






. Although it 
is difficult to analytically solve the most efficient cardholder fee and product price, we are able 
to show providing rewards is unlikely the most efficient in this case.
17   
3.5 When Merchants Practice Discriminatory Pricing 
The previous subsections examined the most efficient fee structure and product price 
when merchants are not allowed to price discriminate their customers.  This subsection considers 
how the change in this assumption affects the most efficient fee structure and product price.   
In each scenario, the maximum social welfare cannot be lowered when merchants set 
different prices according to their customers’ payment methods, because for social planners the 
merchants’ ability to price discriminate their customers means an additional variable they can 
control.  It is easy to show that the merchant’s discriminatory price setting does not affect the 
maximum social welfare when per transaction costs and fees are fixed (Scenarios I and III). In 
contrast, when per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value (Scenarios 
II and IV), it is likely that the merchant’s ability to set different prices increases the maximum 
social welfare: The maximum social welfare is more likely to be achieved when the product 
prices for card-using consumers and for non-card-using consumers, respectively, are set at the 
merchant’s marginal costs, and the sum of a cardholder fee and a merchant fee equals the card 
network’s cost.  Depending on the relationship between the card network’s cost and consumers’ 
transactional benefit from cards ( ] , [ B B b b ), the marginal card user’s transactional benefit from 
cards may be either higher or lower than  , the most efficient marginal card user’s  S b c ˆ −
                                                 
17 See Appendix A.  
  19transactional benefit from cards when merchants are not allowed to set different prices according 
to the payment methods.
18  
4.  Welfare Distribution under the Most Efficient Fee Structure 
This section considers how the most efficient card fee structure affects welfare 
distribution among different parties. Because we were not able to analytically obtain the most 
efficient card fee structure under Scenario IV, we consider only three Scenarios, I, II and III. 
First, we consider the case where merchants are not allowed to set different prices across 
payment methods, and then consider the case where merchants set different prices.   
Under Scenario I, where consumers make a fixed number of transactions and per 
transaction costs and fees are fixed, only the cardholder fee determines social welfare.  The 
product price and the merchant fee do not affect social welfare.  To satisfy the card network’s 
incentive compatibility, the merchant fee cannot be lower than the merchant transactional benefit 
from a card (i.e., ). When the merchant fee is higher than the merchant transactional 
benefit from a card, then the product price set by the merchants is likely to be higher, compared 
with the level of the product price in the economy where no card products are available.
S b m ˆ ≥
19 As a 
result, consumers who use the alternative payment method would likely be worse off, compared 
with the economy without cards. Some card using consumers, whose transactional benefit from a 
card is relatively low, would also likely be worse off, due to the higher product price. These 
consumers’ payment choice between the card and the alternative payment method is very 
sensitive to the cardholder fee, because their transactional benefit from a card is very close to the 
cardholder fee. Some card-using consumers, whose transactional benefit from a card is relatively 
                                                 
18 The most efficient fee structure and product price under Scenario II are solved in Appendix B.   
19 Unless merchants are monopoly. 
  20high, would likely be better off, because their transactional benefit from cards would likely 
exceed the welfare loss due to the higher product price. These consumers’ payment choice 
between the card and the alternative payment method is not sensitive to the cardholder fee 
because their transactional benefit from cards far exceeds the cardholder fee.
20   Thus, under the 
most efficient card fee structure, some consumers would likely be worse off, even when the 
surplus of consumers as a whole would increase. As long as merchants practice marginal cost 
pricing, their profits are not affected by the merchant fee set by the card networks.        
Under Scenario II, where consumers make a fixed number of transactions and per 
transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, social welfare is affected by 
the cardholder fee and product price.  When the aggregate surpluses from using a card are greater 
than the aggregate surpluses from using the alternative payment method, the product price set at 
the highest level maximizes the social welfare.  This product price, however, would reduce the 
welfare of consumers who use the alternative payment method and who use a card but their 
transactional benefit from a card is relatively lower. If, on the other hand, the aggregate surpluses 
from using a card are smaller than the aggregate surpluses from using the alternative payment 
method, the product price set at the lowest level maximizes social welfare. Under this product 
price, consumers who use the alternative payment method would unlikely be worse off compared 
with the economy without cards at all. Depending on the most efficient product price, the most 
efficient card fee structure would possibly make some consumers worse off even if it would 
make the surplus of consumers as a whole increase.   
Under Scenario III, where a consumer’s demand function for goods is downward-sloping 
and per transaction costs and fees are fixed, the cardholder fee, the merchant fee and the product 
                                                 
20 However, these consumers’ choice among the card products, such as the brand of the card or the issuer of the card, 
may be very sensitive to the cardholder fees (rewards). 
  21price, all affect social welfare.  Under the most efficient fee structure and product price, the card 
networks and the merchants earn zero profits. The surplus of a consumer who uses the alternative 
payment method would not be reduced compared with the economy without cards. All card-
using consumers would likely be better off. Unlike the previous two scenarios, under Scenario 
III, the most efficient fee structure and product price would not make any consumers worse off.   
Finally, when the merchants set the different prices according to their customers’ 
payment methods, the most efficient fee structure and product price would be less likely to affect 
the surplus of a consumer who uses the alternative payment method. Card-using consumers are 
better off with cards.  Thus, the total consumer surpluses would be higher with cards than those 
without cards. The card networks would earn zero profits and the merchants would likely earn 
the same profits with and without cards.   
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examined the most efficient fee structure and product price and their effects 
on the welfare distribution. Although it is not always the case, in most cases the most efficient 
cardholder fee is the difference between the card network’s costs of processing a card transaction 
and the merchant transactional benefit from a card transaction. Therefore, in most cases, 
providing rewards to card-using consumers is the most efficient only when the merchant 
transactional benefit from a card transaction exceeds the card network’s costs.  
The most efficient fee structure and product price do not necessarily make all parties 
involved in the payment card market better off.  Especially, consumers who use the alternative 
payment method, instead of a card, would likely be worse off, if the product price they face is 
higher. Since the product price is generally positively correlated with the merchant fee, the 
higher the merchant fee, the worse off the consumers who use the alternative payment method 
  22are.  Moreover, not all card-using consumers are better off with the most efficient fee structure 
and product price.  Card-using consumers whose choice of payment method between the card 
and the alternative payment method is very sensitive to the cardholder fee (or rewards) would 
likely be worse off if the product price is higher. In contrast, card-using consumers whose 
transactional benefit from cards is high would likely be better off.  Because of the incentive 
compatibility constraints, the merchants and card networks would be unlikely to incur losses 
under the most efficient fee structure and product price.    
Whether the most efficient cardholder fee is positive or negative is an empirical question. 
Available existing cost studies, which used relatively old information on merchant costs, suggest 
that the most efficient cardholder fee may likely be positive, which implies providing rewards 
may not be the most efficient.
21  In order for policymakers to accurately evaluate whether 
currently provided payment card rewards are efficient or not, collecting comprehensive and 
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A. Providing rewards is unlikely the most efficient in Scenario IV.  
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  26B. The most efficient fee structure with merchants’ discriminatory pricing in Scenario II.  
The marginal card user is indifferent between using a card or an alternative payment 
method, which implies that: 
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Equation B3 implies social welfare increases as price for cash users decreases. The 
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